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Fault Confinement Mechanisms on CAN : Analysis
and Improvements
Bruno Gaujal and Nicolas Navet
Abstract— The CAN protocol possesses fault confinement
mechanisms aimed at differentiating between short disturbances
caused by electromagnetic interferences (EMI) and permanent
failures due to hardware dysfunctioning. In this study, we derive
a Markovian analysis of these mechanisms which enable to assess
the risk of reaching one of the two degraded modes bus-off
and error-passive defined by CAN. We identify several problems
with the existing mechanisms, the major one being that the bus-
off state is reached too easily. In particular it happens with
bursts of EMI causing several consecutive transmission errors.
We propose new mechanisms that address these drawbacks. The
basic idea is to weigh the progression towards the degraded mode
by the quantity of information given by the last transmission. In
our experiments, these mechanisms proved to be effective: the
hitting time of bus-off for non-faulty nodes increases hugely while
faulty systems reach bus-off in the same amount of time. In the
last part of the paper, implementation issues are discussed and
different techniques for tuning the parameters of the algorithm
are provided, either off-line or at run-time.
Index Terms— Real-Time Systems, Fault Tolerance, Fault Con-
finement, Controller Area Network, Electromagnetic Interfer-
ences.
I. INTRODUCTION
CAN (Controller Area Network) is a broadcast bus withpriority based access to the medium which has become a
de-facto standard for data transmission in automotive applica-
tions. On a CAN network nodes do not possess an address and
no single node plays a preponderant role in the protocol. Each
message has an identifier, unique to the whole system, that
serves two purposes : assigning a priority for the transmission
(the lower the numerical value, the greater the priority) and
identifying the message for filtering upon reception. Data,
possibly segmented in several frames, may be transmitted
periodically, sporadically or on-demand. A minimal CAN
communication profile consists of a three-layered architecture :
physical layer, Data-Link Layer (DLL) and application layer.
The DLL is implanted in an electronic component called a
CAN controller. The ISO standards ([1] and [2]) only define
the physical layer and DLL, but proposals have been made for
the application layer (CAN Application Layer - CAL see [3])
or for complete profiles based on the two normalized layers
(Smart Distributed Systems - SDS see [4], DeviceNet see [5]
or CANopen which uses a subset of CAL see [6]).
CAN has efficient error detection mechanisms. In [7], the
authors have shown the probability of undetected transmission
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errors during the lifetime of a vehicle to be extremely low,
that is why we will further assume that all errors are correctly
detected. Each station which detects an error sends an ”error
flag” which is a particular frame composed of 6 consecutive
dominant bits (in CAN’s terminology, the dominant bit value
is ”0” while ”1” is said the recessive bit value) that enables
all the stations on the bus to be aware of the transmission
error. The corrupted frame automatically re-enters into the next
arbitration phase, which can lead to missed deadlines. The
error recovery time, defined as the time from detecting an
error until the possible start of a new frame, is 17 to 31 bit
times (where the bit time is the time between the emission of
two successive bits of the same frame).
To prevent a defective node from perturbing the functioning
of the whole system (for instance by repetitively sending the
so-called error frames that signal transmission errors) the CAN
protocol uses fault confinement mechanisms. Their objectives
are (1) to detect permanent hardware dysfunctioning and (2)
to switch off defective nodes. The detailed functioning scheme
of these mechanisms is described in Section II.
CAN fault confinement mechanisms are interesting features
from the dependability point of view but their counterpart is
that a good-functioning node may become error passive, or
worse, may be bus-off just because of transmission errors. This
is particularly a problem for in-vehicle networks where EMI
might be very important : Bit Error Rate at order of magnitude
of 10−3 are possible during short periods of time for instance
when the vehicle is close to a high-power Radio Frequency
transmitter or close to a high-voltage power supply.
Several studies were conducted to assess the impact of trans-
mission errors on the respect of message real-time constraints
on a CAN bus. In [8], [9], Tindell et al. have proposed a
response time analysis that takes into account the possibility
that transmission errors can occur. Their error model is deter-
ministic in the sense that it assumes that the number of errors
during any time interval can be bounded. In [10] and [11],
a probabilistic fault model that can model single-bit faults as
well as burst errors is adopted and it is used for analytically
evaluating the probability that a message fails to meet its
deadline. This approach has been made less pessimistic in [12].
To our best knowledge, no probabilistic analysis of CAN’s
fault confinement mechanisms has been done yet.
In Section II, CAN’s fault confinement mechanisms are
described. A Markovian analysis of the bus-off and error-
passive hitting times is given in Section III and IV. The
Section V is devoted to the proposed new fault confinement
mechanisms and to the evaluation of their performances.
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Finally, implementation issues on existing hardware are ad-
dressed in Section VI.
II. CAN’S FAULT CONFINEMENT MECHANISMS
A CAN controller of each station possesses 2 distinct error
counters :
• the Transmit Error Counter (TEC) which counts the
number of transmission errors detected on the frames sent
by the station,
• the Receive Error Counter (REC) which counts the num-
ber of transmission errors detected on the frames received
by the station.
Each time a frame is received or transmitted correctly by a
station, the value of the corresponding counter is decreased
(except when its value is already zero). Similarly, each time a
transmission error is detected, the value of the corresponding
counter is increased. Depending on the value of both counters,
the station will be in one of the 3 states defined by the
protocol :
• Error Active (REC<128 and TEC<128) : this is the
normal operating mode, the station can normally send
and receive frames. This is the default state at controller
initialization.
• Error Passive ((REC>127 or TEC>127) and TEC≤255 :
the station may emit but it must wait 8 additional bits
after the end of the last transmitted frame. Therefore
the frames sent by the station are no longer certain to
meet the worst-case response times computed through
schedulability analysis.
• Bus-off (TEC>255) : The station is automatically
switched off from the bus. In this state, the station can
neither send nor receive frames. A node can leave the bus-
off state after a hardware or software reset (normal mode
request) and after having successfully monitored 128
occurrences of 11 consecutive recessive bits (a sequence
of 11 consecutive recessive bits corresponding to the
ACK, EOF and the intermission field of a data frame
that has not been corrupted).
The rules for increasing and decreasing the TEC and the REC
of a station are somewhat complex, see [1] pp 48-49. In the
rest of the article, we will assume that no errors occur during
the signalling of an error (no bit error in an active error
flag). Furthermore, we will not consider three exceptions to
the general rules listed below (see [1] pp 48-49, exceptions
listed in points b) and c) ).
Under these assumptions, the rules for modifying the
counter value of the stations become :
1) Frame transmission successful. If the node is not the
sending node : if the REC is between 1 and 127, then
it is decreased by one. If the REC’s value is nil, it stays
unchanged. Finally, if its value is greater than 127, it
randomly takes a value between 119 and 127. If the
node is the sending node : if the TEC is not nil, it is
decreased by one, otherwise it remains unchanged.
2) Unsuccessful transmission (transmission error detected).
If the node is not the sending node : The REC is
increased by one. If the node is the sending node: the
TEC is increased by 8.
Whatever the result of a transmission, at most one counter is
modified on a given station.
III. BUS-OFF HITTING TIME
CAN fault confinement mechanisms are conceived to dis-
connect defective nodes from the network and prevent them
from perturbing the whole network. However, under severe
electro-magnetic interference conditions, one or several nodes
can reach the bus-off state just because of transmission errors.
It is thus important to estimate the probability of such events
which can be achieved through the knowledge of the average
hitting time of the bus-off state and of the variance of the
bus-off hitting times. For this purpose, we model the Transmit
Error Counter (TEC) with a Markov chain in continuous time
(also called a Markov process).
A. Modeling
Under the assumption that state changes are exponentially
distributed, the evolution of the TEC can be modeled by a
Markov process. Let λk0 be the rate of transmission of non-
corrupted messages for station k and λk1 be its rate of corrupted
messages.
The general rule is that the TEC value is increased by
8 on the transmitting node if a frame is corrupted and that
the TEC is decreased by 1 if the transmission is successful.
Nevertheless, different cases have to be distinguished. The
infinitesimal generator of the Markov process for the different
possible values of the TEC (denoted by i) is given by the
following graphs :
• i = 0 :
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The computation of λk0 and λk1 is detailed in Appendix II. The
state 256, which corresponds to the bus-off state, is a so-called
absorbing state from which it is impossible to escape and it
stops the process. This is exactly the functioning scheme of
the CAN protocol. When a station becomes ”bus-off”, it can
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Q =
0 1 2 ... 8 9 .. 253 254 255 256
0 −λk1 0 0 ... λk1 0 .. 0 0 0 0
1 λk0 −λk 0 ... 0 λk1 .. 0 0 0 0
2 0 λk0 −λk ... 0 0 .. 0 0 0 0
. . . . . . . .. . . . .
. . . . . . . .. . . . .
254 0 0 0 ... 0 0 .. λk0 −λk 0 λk1
255 0 0 0 ... 0 0 .. 0 λk0 −λk λk1
256 0 0 0 ... 0 0 .. 0 0 0 0
Fig. 1. Generator matrix of the bus-off stochastic process with λk = (λk0 +λk1) (the sum of each row of Q is 0).
neither send nor receive frames. With the previously exposed
rules, one obtains the generator matrix of size 257∗257 (the
Markov chain having 257 states) shown in Figure 1.
For convenience, this Markov process will be transformed
in the stochastically equivalent discrete time Markov chain
termed the uniformized chain. Let qi = ∑ j 6=iQi, j be the total
rate out of state i and qmax = supi≥0 qi. As qmax < ∞, one can
uniformize the Markov process so that it is equivalent to a
Markov chain with kernel P which has the following entries :
Pi, j =
{
qi, j/qmax, i 6= j,
1−qi/qmax, i = j (1)
The steps of the Markov chain correspond to an iid process
of duration exponentially distributed with parameter qmax. The
matrix P under its ”canonical form” is given below :
P =
[
Z R
0 1
]
(2)
where Z is the original matrix without the 257th line and
the 257th row. All states in Z are transient : starting from
such a state, there exists a positive probability that the process
may not eventually return to this state. The vector R is the
257th column vector of P without the 257th element (this latter
element being the absorbing state that models the ”bus-off”
state).
One denotes by T the set of transient states and Ni the
random variable which gives the time needed to reach for the
first time the absorbing state 256 starting from a given state i.
Using a classical ”one-step” analysis, one obtains :
Ni =
{
γi +N j, with probabilityPi, j j ∈ T ,
γi, with probabilityPi,256
(3)
with γi = 1 if i 6= 256 or otherwise 0. Taking expectations, one
obtains :
E[Ni] = Pi,256E[γi]+ ∑
j∈T
Pi, jE[γi +N j]
= γi + ∑
j∈T
Pi, jE[N j] (4)
This set of 257 linear equations can easily be solved using any
numerical or symbolical computation program such as Maple.
E[N0] is the mean hitting time of the bus-off state for the
considered station.
In a similar way, one can compute the variance of the bus-
off hitting time which is by definition equal to V [Ni] =E[N2i ]−
E[Ni]2. One has
N2i =
{
(γi +N j)2 , with probability Pi, j j ∈ T ,
γ2i , with probability Pi,256
(5)
Taking expectations :
E[N2i ] = ∑
j∈T C
Pi, jE[γ2i ]+ ∑
j∈T
Pi, jE[(γi +N j)2]
= γ2i + ∑
j∈T
Pi, jE[(N j + γi)2]
= γi + ∑
j∈T
Pi, jE[N2j ]+2 ∑
j∈T
Pi, jE[N j]γi (6)
After having solved this set of 257 linear equations, the
variance of the first hitting time of the bus-off state is V [N0] =
E[N20 ]−E[N0]2.
B. Numerical applications
To illustrate this analysis, let us consider two CAN nodes
which are parts of an experimental embedded CAN-based
application proposed by PSA (Peugeot-Citro¨en Automobiles
Company) and described in [11]. Six devices exchange mes-
sages on a 250kb/s network : the engine controller, the
wheel angle sensor, the AGB (Automatic Gear Box), the
ABS (Anti-Blocking System), the bodywork gateway and a
device y (the name of this device cannot be communicated
because of confidentiality). The two considered nodes are
the ”engine controller” and the ”bodywork network gateway”
which respectively send the frames of priority {1,3,10} and
{8} of periods {10,20,100} ms and {50} ms respectively. The
average size of the frames for the engine controller is 118.75
bits while 105 bits for the bodywork network gateway. The
characteristics of the 12 frames composing the application is
given in Appendix I.
On Figure 2, one can observe that the average hitting time
greatly varies depending on the Bit Error Rate (BER). For
instance, it takes on average only about 40 seconds for the
engine controller to reach the bus-off state with a BER of
0.001 (corresponding to a frame error rate of 11.17% for the
engine controller) and more than 43360 hours with a BER of
0.0007 (to be compared to the expected cumulated utilization
time of a vehicle which is about 5000 hours). In addition, the
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Fig. 2. Average hitting times of the bus-off state for the engine controller
and the bodywork network gateway with the Bit Error Rate (BER) varying
from 0.0005 to 0.001 .
curves on Figure 2 suggest that the higher the load induced by
a station, the faster the station will reach the bus-off state. For
instance, the average hitting time of the bodywork network
gateway (which generates a nominal load of 0.84% versus
7.6% for the engine controller) is more than 4.3 hours with a
BER of 0.001. It is also noteworthy that the standard deviation
of the hitting times is very important, it is of the same order of
magnitude as the average hitting times which in practice means
that there will be a high variability among the observed hitting
times. For instance, the standard deviation for the bodywork
network gateway is equal to 42.84 hours for a BER of 0.001
while the average hitting time is 43.01 hours.
IV. ERROR-PASSIVE HITTING TIME
An error passive node is not disconnected from the bus.
However, it must wait 8 supplementary bits after the end
of the last transmitted frame before sending a frame. This
may increase the worst-case response times computed through
schedulability analysis. It is thus important for the application
designer to assess the probability of such an event.
A station becomes error-passive if the REC is greater than
127 or if the TEC is equal to 128. The modeling through a
Markov chain is straightforward : each state of the process can
be identified through 2 coordinates (i, j) where for instance
i is the value of the TEC and j the value of the REC. To
evaluate the probability of being error passive, one just has to
compute the time spent in a state such that i > 127 or j = 128
before the occurrence of ”bus-off”. The number of states of the
Markov chain being 257 ·128, the probability transition matrix
is of size (257 ·128)2 ≈ 1,09 ·109 which is too big to obtain
numerical results on desktop workstations. However we can
actually estimate separately the time spent in error passive due
to the reception (REC= 128) and the time due to the emission
(REC> 127).
A. Error-passive due to reception
Under the assumption of exponentially distributed state
changes, one can model the evolution of the REC through a
Markov process. The general rule is that the REC is increased
by 1 on the receiving nodes if the frame is corrupted and
it is decreased by 1 if the transmission is successful. The
infinitesimal generator of the Markov process for the different
possible values of the REC (denoted by j) is given by the
following graphs :
• j = 0 :
i 10 
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i 127128 
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Although the CAN standard [1] permits the REC to exceed
128, it is equivalent to consider its maximum value to be 128.
Indeed, if the REC is greater or equal than 127 and a frame is
successfully received then the REC is set to a ”value between
119 and 127”. We have chosen 127 which is the choice leading
to the most pessimistic results from the point of view of the
time spent in error-passive. Denote by λk2 the rate of frames
successfully received by station k :
λk2 = ∑
i 6=k
λi0, (7)
while λk3 is the rate of corrupted frames received by station k :
λk3 = ∑
i 6=k
λi1. (8)
The Markov process corresponding to the above transitions is
then transformed using the uniformization technique described
in paragraph III-A in its stochastically equivalent Markov
chain whose transition probability matrix is denoted by W . The
Markov chain being ergodic (all states are positive recurrent,
aperiodic and there exists only one communication class in
the transition matrix), the stationary probability vector pi can
be computed :
pi = pi ·W, (9)
where pii (ith component of the vector pi) is the proportion
of time the Markov chain spends in state i. The time spent
in error-passive due to receptions is thus given by pi128. With
a BER equal to 0.001, we obtain for the engine controller
pi128 = 6.65 · 10−131, with a BER equal to 0.0005 one has
pi128 = 1.02 · 10−170. The expected number of steps between
successive visits to state 128 is 1/pi128 or (1/pi128) · (λk2 +λk3)
seconds. In our example, with a BER of 0.001, the expected
time between two occurrences of the error-passive state due to
reception is more than 10124 years for the engine controller.
Furthermore the probability of being in a state larger than
8 is about 7 · 10−10 in the same example. This is consistent
with simulation results were such a state was never reached
(see paragraph IV-B). These results show that under realistic
bus perturbation level, the time spent in error-passive due to
reception is almost nil.
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B. Error-passive due to emission
Using the Markov chain that models the evolution of the
TEC and whose transition probabilities are given by the matrix
P (see equation (1)), one can compute the time spent in a state
greater than 127. Let Mi be the random variable which gives
the number of steps spent in error-passive due to the TEC
before the station enters the bus-off state. Its expectation is :
E[Mi] = γi +∑Pi, jE[M j], (10)
with γi = 1 if i ≥ 128 or otherwise 0. As can been seen on
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Fig. 3. Average time spent in the error passive state due to transmission for
the engine controller and the bodywork network gateway with the Bit Error
Rate (BER) varying from 0.0005 to 0.001 .
Figure 3 the proportion of time spent in error passive might
be very important for high BER. For instance, the engine
controller spends on average 26.2% of the time in error passive
with a BER of 0.001 and 4.1% for a BER of 0.0009. Logically,
the lower the load induced by a station, the less important the
fraction of time spent in error-passive (e.g. only 2.7% of the
time in error-passive for the bodywork network gateway with
BER= 0.001). The results of paragraph IV-A induce one to
think that a controller almost never reaches error-passive due
to reception and thus the time spent in error-passive can be
estimated only considering the TEC. To verify the correctness
of this statement, we simulated the evolution of the two error
counters. Simulation results were collected on 250 runs where
a run starts with both counters equal to zero and finishes
when the bus-off state is reached. During all simulations, the
maximum value of the REC never exceeded 8 before reaching
bus-off. In addition, if we compare analytical results (given by
equation (10)) that do not consider the REC and simulation
results, the difference between simulation and exact analysis
is always less than 3.3%. The results of the comparison for
various BERs are shown on Figure 4.
C. Conclusion on existing mechanisms
Experiments and computations performed under realistic
assumptions on the bus perturbation level where all nodes
are functioning perfectly (no hardware failure) make us think
that the bus-off is reached too easily (e.g. 40 seconds with
BER= 0.001). Regarding error-passive, the REC is only useful
for nodes that do not emit any messages. As for emitting
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Fig. 4. Difference in percentage between analytical and simulation results
regarding the time spent in error-passive. The considered node is the engine
controller and the BER ranges from 0.0008 to 0.001 .
nodes, as shown in paragraph IV-B, error-passive is almost
always reached because of the TEC. Thus, the time spent
in error-passive can be estimated by computing the evolution
of the TEC. In a strongly disturbed environment, the time
spent in error-passive can be very important and therefore the
application designers should take into account the degraded
temporal behavior of the nodes in this mode.
V. IMPROVED FAULT CONFINEMENT MECHANISMS
If one analyses the current fault confinement mechanisms,
then two issues raise one’s attention : first, all transmission
errors are assumed to be independent of each other and second,
the information given by correct transmissions is barely taken
into account for deciding the current state. In this Section, we
will provide a new proposal for deciding bus-off under more
realistic assumptions :
• Assumption H1) : transmission errors can be correlated.
This point is crucial since the arrival process of errors
is often bursty especially in the context of in-vehicle
embedded applications.
• Assumption H2.a) : faulty nodes cannot send correct
frames.
• Assumption H2.b) : faulty nodes may send correct frames
(according to an iid process).
Of course H2.a and H2.b are mutually exclusive and will be
studied independently.
A station is said to be faulty if it has a hardware problem
(e.g. defective wires). We denote by pki the probability for
the non-faulty station k to emit a frame that will be corrupted
given that the last i− 1 messages (sent by station k) were
corrupted. The value of pki can be estimated according to
statistic measures taken on monitored existing systems as
detailed in Section VI.
In the following, the distribution of the burst size (number of
consecutive corrupted frames) will be identical for all stations.
pki will be denoted by pi when no confusion is possible and it
will be given by the modified geometric distribution proposed
in [11] :
P[error burst length on k ≥ i] = α(ri−1(i− ri)i+ ri) (11)
with the typical parameters α = 0.1 and r = 0.5.
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A. When to decide ”bus-off”?
The actual problem that one has to solve is to detect if
a node is faulty only by looking at the correctness of the
transmitted frames. This immediately raises another issue :
when should one take a decision ? The decision will be more
pertinent if it is taken after a long time since one gathered
more information but on the other hand, if one waits too long,
a faulty station, by successive retransmission on the bus, might
lead frames of other stations to not respect their deadlines.
Our proposal is that the decision can be delayed until the
suspected node might jeopardize the real-time behavior of
the other stations. We denote by Nk the maximum number
of retransmission of a frame of station k such that the
deadlines of all frames of other stations are still respected.
It seems natural that our mechanism should decide ”bus-off”
after Nk consecutive faulty messages. Unfortunately it is not
satisfactory because on highly loaded systems where frames
have a small laxity, Nk can be very small, for instance lower
than 5, and with such a little information the decision to put
a node in bus-off state might be wrong. We propose to decide
”bus-off” after Fk consecutive faulty messages where
Fk = max{Nk,min{Φ| ∏
j=1..Φ
p j < ε}} (12)
with ε is small enough to be considered neglectable (e.g.
10−12). On highly loaded systems, where messages have a
small laxity, Nk might be very small and ε should be large
enough in order to keep the number of missed deadlines
(of other stations) low. On such systems, transmission errors
will necessarily lead some of the frames not to respect their
deadline whatever the mechanisms involved. On less constraint
systems, Nk will generally be larger than Φ and thus no
deadline will be missed. As suggested by an anonymous
referee, one can request that, for the most important nodes
such as the engine controller, the decision of bus-off is taken
after a longer period of time than for less important nodes
and the shut-off time can be weighted with some parameter
reflecting the importance of the node. This can be done by
individualizing for each node the value of ε in Equation 12.
On a CAN bus, a frame mi can be delayed by the retransmis-
sion of a frame m j only if m j has a higher priority (denoted
m j Â mi). To compute Nk, one has to consider the highest
priority frame sent by station k since it is the frame that
will delay the largest number of frames (line 4 in Figure 5).
The maximum overhead induced by each retransmission is not
necessarily the size of the highest priority frame since lower
priority frames of the same station having a larger size may
also be corrupted and delay the other stations. Thus, in the
worst case, the overhead per transmission error is equal to the
largest frame sent by the station (second parameter of function
Ri at line 7 of Figure 5).
If station k emits the lowest priority frames of the applica-
tion, it will not delay any other frame and thus Nk would be
infinite in theory. In practice, the software layers on top of the
communication controller have to be informed in a reasonable
amount of time that the station is defective; for instance to
execute some diagnostics or reboot the node. Nk has thus to
be to set to a maximum value which we chose arbitrarily in
this study to be 50 (around 20ms on a 250kb/s network). The
algorithm for computing Nk is given in Figure 5 where Di is
1 funct INTEGER computeNk(set of messages T )
2 INTEGER Nk := 50, tmp;
3 for i := 1 to #T do
4 if mi /∈Mk ∧ highestPrio{mj ∈ Mk} Â mi
5 then
6 tmp := 0;
7 while (Ri(tmp, max
j∈Mk
Cj) ≤ Di) ∧ (tmp− 1 < Nk)
8 do tmp + +; od
9 if (tmp− 1 < Nk) then Nk := tmp− 1; fi
10 fi
11 return Nk;
12 end
Fig. 5. Function computing the value of Nk , the maximum number of
retransmission of a frame of station k such that the deadlines of all frames of
other stations are still respected. Mk denotes the set of tasks sent by station
k.
the deadline of frame mi and Ri(n,C) its worst-case response
time with n retransmissions of a frame of size C bits :
Ri(n,C) =Ci + Ji + Ii(n,C) (13)
where Ji is the maximal jitter of mi, and Ii(n,C) is the limit
when m goes to infinity of the following recurrence relation :
I0i (n,C) = 0, Imi (n,C) = E(n,C)+ max
m j≺mk
(C j)
+ ∑
m jÂmk
⌈
Im−1n,C + J j + τbit
Tj
⌉
C j, (14)
where E is the function that counts the overhead induced by
n retransmissions of a frame of size C bits :
E(n,C) = n · (23τbit +C) , (15)
with 23 bits being the maximum size of an error frame.
B. Case H2.a : defect nodes cannot send correct frames
This assumption implies that whenever a station emits a
correct message, we know for sure that the node is not faulty.
1) Proposal: The variable i identifies the state of the
system. If the message that has been sent is correct then i
is set to zero (assumption H2.a) otherwise i is increased by
one. If i has reached Fk then the station becomes bus-off.
2) Markovian analysis: This mechanism can be analyzed
under a Markovian model of the dynamics of the system
(inter-arrivals are exponentially distributed). The correspond-
ing Markov chain (after uniformization) is defined by the
following transition probabilities P[i+1|i] = pi, P[0|i] = 1− pi,
P[Fk|Fk] = 1 and it is represented on Figure 6.
The average hitting time of bus-off is shown on Figure 7 for
various BERs with a bursty error arrival process defined by
equation (11) with α = 0.1 and r = 0.5. With our proposal, the
hitting times are much longer for high values of the BER even
though the error model is now considered to be bursty. For
instance, with a BER of 0.001 the hitting time for the engine
controller is 221 hours versus 40 seconds with the existing
mechanisms. In addition, the hitting times are less sensitive
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Fig. 6. Markov chain modeling mechanisms of case H2.a with Fk = 4.
to the value of the BER which will enable the application
designer to assess the risk of bus-off in a satisfactory manner
without an exact knowledge of the BER. On the contrary, the
hitting time is very sensitive to the priority of the messages
(due to Nk). If the application designer is ready to accept some
missed deadlines, he has the possibility to increase the value
of Nk.
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Fig. 7. Average hitting time of the bus-off state for the engine controller and
the bodywork network gateway with the BER varying from 0.0005 to 0.001
and Fk = 31 for the bodywork network gateway and Fk = 18 for the engine
controller (smallest value of Fk for the 6 nodes of the application).
C. Case H2.b : defect nodes can send correct frames
Here, we denote by qk the probability that station k emits a
correct frame while being faulty. It is natural to assume that
emitting two consecutive correct frames while faulty are two
independent events and thus has probability (qk)2.
1) Proposal: The idea is to weigh the progression towards
bus-off by the quantity of information given by the last
transmission. The state of the system is given by two counters
(i, j) where i indicates the proximity of bus-off and j is
the current number of consecutive transmission errors. The
initial state is (1,0) and the counters evolve according to the
following rules :
• on the occurrence of an error (i, j)→ (di/pk je, j+1),
• on a successful transmission (i, j)→ (di.qke,0),
• the bus-off state is reached when i ≥ 1/∏ j=1..Fk pk j .
Imagine that the probability to emit a corrupted message is
large (bursts of errors are likely), if the next transmission is
unsuccessful, then the quantity of information brought by this
event is small, therefore one should not approach bus-off too
much. This is the same for a good transmission, imagine that
a successful transmission of a faulty node is very unlikely (qk
is small), then the quantity of information is very important
and it is natural to make a big step away from bus-off. It
is noteworthy that when qk goes to zero then this approach
becomes more and more similar to case H2.a (the state is very
close to zero on a correct message). On the other hand, when
the error probabilities are independent (pki are all equal to pk),
then this mechanism is similar to the existing scheme when
one consider the logarithm of the state with steps - log(pk)
(with log(pk < 0)) instead of +8 on errors and + log(qk) (with
log(qk < 0) instead of -1 on success. If one wants to mimic
the existing scheme, one just has to take q8k = pk (for instance
pk = 10−8 and qk = 10−1). The underlying assumption in CAN
current mechanisms is thus that 8 consecutive correct messages
sent by a faulty node (q8k) has the same probability as one
faulty message sent by a non-faulty node (pk). The validity
of such an hypothesis is questionable especially under heavily
perturbed environments where pk may be large. Our proposal
possesses two advantages over the existing scheme : the errors
are not necessarily independent and second, the parameters pk
and qk can be set according to the system and its environment.
2) Markovian analysis: As for the previous cases, one
can make a Markovian analysis of this mechanism using
Poisson arrival for the frames and assuming that αi = log pki
and β = logqk are integer values. The Markov chain has the
following transition probabilities : P[(i+α j, j)|(i, j)] = p j+1,
P[(i−β,0)|(i, j)] = 1− p j+1. The corresponding Markov chain
is displayed in Figure 8.
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Fig. 9. Average hitting time of the bus-off state for the bodywork network
gateway with the BER varying from 0.0005 to 0.001 and for q = 1/10 and
1/100.
As can be seen on Figure 9, an interesting property of the
proposal is that the average time to bus-off is roughly linear
in qk (because only log(qk) is involved in the dynamics).
VI. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
The implementation of our proposal at the communication
controller level is easily feasible but it requires to redesign
some parts of an existing controllers. A low-cost alternative
is to bypass the existing CAN fault confinement mechanisms
implemented in silicon and to take the bus-off decision at
the application level. The easiest way to achieve this is to
allow write access to the TEC located in the communication
controller and to clear the TEC to 0 before it reaches 255.
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Fig. 8. Markov chain for the analysis of the proposed fault-confinement mechanisms where β = 1, α1 = 2 and α2 = 1. The value of Gk is ∑ j=1,··· ,Fk−1 α j .
To the best of our knowledge, no such controller with writing
access to the TEC is available yet. However, depending on the
controller, there may exist other way to clear the TEC. For
instance, the popular NEC’s DCAN module clears the error
counters to 0 when it is switched to sleep mode ([13] pp 253).
It also enables an automatic software reset (and thus clears the
error counters) after the occurrence of bus-off ([13] pp 234).
Although these solutions are not very convenient, they provide
a way to implement our proposal on existing controllers.
In the rest of this Section, we will discuss how to set the
values of the pki which are the parameters of the error model
involved in our proposal. The setting of the pki can be done
using measurements carried out on a prototype or even at
run-time. Some CAN controllers such as the NEC DCAN
module or the Philips SJA1000 ([14]) have interesting error-
signalling features such as readable error counters or interrupt-
triggering on transmission occurrences. Those features will
enable the determination of an error model parameter-setting
procedure that will dynamically change the parameter’s values
when these become improper in the light of the current bus
perturbation level. Such an on-line adaptive parameter-setting
procedure would be well suited for systems within which the
bus perturbation level may vary greatly over time, such as
automotive communication systems.
A. Off-line parameters setting
Recall that pki is the probability for the non-faulty station
k to emit at least a corrupted frame given that the last
i−1 messages sent by station k were corrupted with pk1 the
probability to emit at least one corrupted frame given that the
previous frame was correct. The Figure 10 represents a sample
measurement taken on a prototype. On this short fragment
of trajectory there exists 6 elementary events that give us
information to assess the value of pk1 . These events are the
results of the transmission in the interval [t2, t3[, [t4, t5[, [t6, t7[,
[t7, t8[, [t9, t10[ and [t13, t14[ (they all have in common that the
transmission in the preceding interval was successful). On this
sample trajectory, pk1 can be estimated to 1/3 since 2 frames
out of the 6 transmitted were corrupted.
successful transmission
bus idle
corrupted frame
t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t13 t14t12t1
Fig. 10. A sample measurement of the frames sent by a given station k.
Denote by Rk[i] the outcome of the ith transmission (either
successful or corrupted frame) of station k and #Rk the number
of frames of the sample. The array badOutcome[i] stores
the number of frames that were corrupted given that (i−
1) successive transmission errors occurred previously while
allOutcome[i] stores the total number of cases where (i− 1)
successive errors occurred. The algorithm for computing the
pki values is given on Figure 11 where max is the maximum
size of all bursts of the sample.
B. On-line Parameters setting
Two main design goals of the parameter setting scheme are
to keep the complexity low and to be robust to FER variations.
Since on a fixed time interval the number of errors might be
arbitrarily small, we propose to set the parameters using the
last n bursts of errors. The value of n should be chosen such
that the parameters actually reflect the current bus perturbation
level while keeping the results statistically valid. In practice,
we suggest values of n greater than 100. We consider two
parameter setting procedures : one using the sample made of
the last n bursts of errors and the second with a sliding-window
of size n. Whatever the technique, the initial parameters should
be set to “reasonable” values chosen according to measures
or from the experience gained on similar systems. It is not
mandatory that the computation of the parameters is performed
on all nodes of the network (some CAN nodes do not even
have computational capability); a chosen node can broadcast
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY, VOL. 54, NO. 3, MAY 2005
 	
ﬀﬂﬁﬃ! "
 	
$#&%ﬂ'(*),+.-/ﬁ&0 -/#ﬂ1324ﬃ657 389 389 38;:<:<8= ?>ﬂ"
 	
@#&ABAC'(*),+.-/ﬁ&0 -/#ﬂ132ﬃD5. 389 38= 8;:<:E89 ?>ﬂ"
FﬀGﬂH JIKﬃMLON G@PRQOSUTG
V FWQOS 0 C2ﬃYX,Z\[=[9]3^?_9`a
N;b&c?d
efﬀﬂﬁ.ghgi"
V F hjﬃkLRlnmo_=p3`q^erns_utshv3Zn_hwﬂvZxhv@m\l
N;b&c?dy$#&%&'(e*);+.-zﬁ&0 efﬀﬂﬁ;2{ghg"
#&ABA|'(e*);+.-zﬁ&0 efﬀﬂﬁ;2{ghgh"
}
cﬂ~ $c
V F hjﬃkL
N;b&c?d#&ABA|'(e*);+.-zﬁ&0 efﬀﬂﬁJYL;2ghg"
}
efﬀﬂﬁOIﬃ 3"
}
G4T
FﬀGﬂH JIKﬃMLON G -z#ﬂ1 TG
V F #&ABA|'(e*);+.-zﬁ&0 C2jﬃ 
N;b&c?d

Sﬃ$#&%&'(e*);+.-zﬁ&0 C2B#&ACAC'(*),+.-zﬁ&0 |2|"
}
G4T
Fig. 11. Algorithm for computing the value of pki .
the parameters to all other nodes periodically of after each
change of the values of the parameters.
1) Sampling: The parameters are estimated every n bursts
of errors. The new set of pki ’s is computed with the algorithm
described in Figure 11. It may replace the older pki ’s values
but influence of the past can also be taken into account for
instance using the exponential smoothing technique which
assigns exponentially decreasing weights as the observation
get older. In the latter case, if we denote p˜ki as the value of
pki computed on the last n bursts of errors, the new value of
pki is given by :
pki = (1−α) · p˜ki +α · pki
where the smoothing constant α can be determined on samples
of measurements such as to minimize the squared errors be-
tween the forecasts and the actual observations. Two important
advantages of this strategy are the low complexity of the
computation and the infrequent update of the parameters.
2) Sliding window: Another strategy is to update the pa-
rameters after each burst of errors. The oldest burst of the
sample is simply replaced by the new observation according
to the algorithm given on Figure 12.
This technique should provide a better adaptation to the
current bus perturbation than the sampling of size n bursts, its
drawback being a more frequent update of the parameter.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this study, we proposed a Markovian analysis of the exist-
ing fault-confinement mechanisms of the CAN protocol. These
results may help the application designer to assess the risk
of reaching bus-off and error-passive. It also provides some
evidence that the existing mechanisms has several shortages :
bus-off state is reached too fast for non-faulty nodes under
high perturbation, the REC is useless in nearly all cases and
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Fig. 12. Updating the value the pki ’s values after the end of a burst.
the parameters cannot be tuned (for instance to consider bursty
errors).
We have proposed two new mechanisms that address these
drawbacks. These mechanisms can mimic the original ones
with adequate parameters but also show the interest of con-
sidering bursty-errors : the hitting time of bus-off for non-
faulty nodes increases hugely while faulty systems reach bus-
off within the same amount of time. The same scheme can be
adapted easily for deciding error-passive.
The implementation issues raised by our proposals have
been addressed in Section VI. Different algorithms for setting
the error model parameters have been provided : this can be
done off-line, using measurements carried out on a prototype,
or at run-time with two strategies that induce different over-
heads.
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APPENDIX I
DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE STUDY
The application considered from Section 2 is composed of
12 frames (e.g. speed and torque from the engine controller)
listed in figure 13. The transmission rate of the CAN bus is
250kb/s. The Data Length Code (DLCi) denotes the number
of bytes of frame i, Ti is the period and one assumes deadlines
to be equal to the periods.
APPENDIX II
COMPUTATION OF THE RATES λk0 AND λk1
Let us denote by Si,n the size of the nth instance of message
i having DLCi data bytes. Due to CAN’s bit-stuffing, all
instances of the same message may not have the same size.
However, Si,n remains bounded:
47+8DLCi ≤ Si,n ≤ 47+8DLCi +
⌊
34+8DLCi−1
4
⌋
. (16)
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Priority (Id) Transmitter node DLCi Ti
1 engine controller 8 10 ms
2 wheel angle sensor 3 14 ms
3 engine controller 3 20 ms
4 AGB 2 15 ms
5 ABS 5 20 ms
6 ABS 5 40 ms
7 ABS 4 15 ms
8 bodywork gateway 5 50 ms
9 device y 4 20 ms
10 engine controller 7 100 ms
11 AGB 5 50 ms
12 ABS 1 100 ms
Fig. 13. Message set of the application.
If one considers the size of all instances to be equal to the
upper bound, one can derive a conservative value for the
unsuccessful transmission rate by using the same method as
for the stochastic case below and replacing Si,n by the upper
bound. If more information can be obtained for the Si,n then
more accurate estimation can be computed. In the following,
we assume that it is possible to estimate the distribution of the
Si,n or at least its first J moments.
The transmission time is Ci,n
def= Si,n ·τbit where τbit is the bit
time (i.e. the time between two successive bits). The Frame
Error Rate for the nth instance of message i, called FERi,n,
can be estimated using the Bit Error Rate (BER) :
FERi,n = 1− (1−BER)Si,n .
One denotes by λi,n the rate of unsuccessful transmissions
(i.e. corrupted frames) of the nth instance of message i.
One has to take into account the surcharge generated by
transmission errors. To each transmission error corresponds
a retransmission which can be, in its turn, corrupted (and so
on). One has the following relation :
λi,n1 = FERi,n(
(
1
Ti
)
+
(
1
Ti
)
FERi,n +(
1
Ti
)
FERi,n2 + . . . )
=
FERi,n
Ti
(1−FERi,n) .
The average rate of unsuccessful transmissions for message i
is λi1 = (1/Ti) ·E[FERi,n/(1−FERi,n)] and the average rate on
station k is λk1 = ∑i λi1. This quantity can be computed using
the distributions of Si,n for all i and n. Furthermore, since
BER is small compared to 1, E[FERi,n/(1−FERi,n)] can be
approximated to
E[1/(1−SiBER)]−1 ≈ ∑
j=1..J
BER j ·E[S ji ],
if the moments have sub-exponential growth.
As for the rate of successful transmission on station k,
λk0, it is equal to ∑i 1/Ti since all messages are successfully
transmitted exactly once.
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